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Abstract
Lindley (1977) laid the groundwork for a statistical treatment of evaluating the weight of evidence in forensic
science based on a subjective Bayesian formulation of the problem. He noted that the decision maker (DM) need
only multiply her likelihood ratio (LR) for the evidence (Lindley simply called it the factor multiplying odds)
by her prior odds for guilt/innocence of the defendant to obtain her posterior odds for the same. The current
thinking among many leading forensic scientists and statisticians engaged in forensic evidence interpretation is
that a forensic expert should compute a LR as a summary of their analysis and present its value as the weight
of evidence to interested parties in a written report or to the triers-of-fact during testimony (see ENFSI (2015)).
The DMs could then use the LR value provided by the forensic expert to update their own respective prior odds
of guilt to arrive at their posterior odds. Presenting a LR value as the weight of evidence is seen as an application
of Bayesian decision theory, and, by mathematical arguments of coherence and rationality, is therefore normative
(i.e., forensic experts should communicate in this manner).
In general, forensic experts are called upon not to reach actionable decisions, but to help inform others who
are charged with making a decision. How to decide something for yourself and how to relay information to others
are two starkly different questions studied under separate theoretical disciplines. Transferring information is not
within the purview of decision theory which considers only the decision making entity. Facilitating a meaningful
exchange of scientific observations among interested parties is a fundamental purpose of measurement science
and the suitability of reporting a LR must therefore be assessed in a very different manner.
From the perspective of metrology, the proposed LR framework asks the forensic expert to measure the
weight of evidence on behalf of the DM and report its value for subsequent use in Bayes formula. In this context,
an appropriate uncertainty statement would assess the extent to which the expert’s LR value may differ from
the LR perceived by any given DM following careful review of the complete body of evidence considered by
the expert. While difficult, or maybe even impractical, this assessment is nonetheless critical to establishing
the suitability of transferring a LR value as the weight of forensic evidence. Overlooking or dismissing the
relevant uncertainty treats the value obtained by an expert as though it is a universal and exactly accurate
characterization of weight of evidence - a perfect measurement. Given the degree to which any LR depends upon
subjective beliefs and choices of its evaluator, we are concerned that assessments of repeatability, reproducibility,
and traceability, properties that give a quantity the status of a measurement, would find that LR values are not
sufficiently transferable for their intended use.
In this article we provide a rebuttal against the possible perception that a single number, such as the LR, can
provide an objective or definitive weight of evidence. We argue that presenting a probabilistic interpretation of
evidence in the form of a LR would require an extensive uncertainty characterization. We illustrate the concepts
of a Lattice of Assumptions and an Uncertainty Pyramid as tools for evaluating the uncertainty attributable
to the choice of assumptions used during analysis under the constraint that any assumptions are judged to be
consistent with available empirical information. When such analyses are considered untenable, we argue the LR
simply should not be considered amenable to measurement by one person on behalf of another and alternative
presentations of evidence should be pursued. In our view, forensic experts should not feel it is their duty to
provide a steadfast interpretation. Rather, a forensic expert should assist DMs form their own interpretations
from a clear understanding of the relevant, objective, and demonstrable information. We hope this article
will help clarify distinctions between personal interpretations and transferable information and inspire those in
the forensic science community to carefully consider principles of measurement science when establishing their
professional communication practices.
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Introduction
In criminal and civil cases alike, the judicial system involves many individuals making decisions
following exposure to some form of evidence (e.g., district attorneys deciding whether or not
to file criminal charges, prosecution or defense attorneys deciding or advising their clients
whether to accept a plea agreement or proceed to trial, jurors voting guilty or not guilty).
These decision makers (DMs) often rely on the findings of forensic experts (and, in the case
of attorneys, how those findings will be perceived by others), whether expressed as a written
report or through testimony at a trial, to help inform their decision. How experts express their
findings and how DMs factor that information into their ultimate decisions remain areas of
great public importance and current research; see, for example, Thompson and Newman (2015)
and Thompson, et al., (2013).
Lindley (1977) laid the groundwork for a statistical treatment of evaluating the weight of
evidence1 in forensic science.2 His framework is based on a subjective Bayesian modeling of the
problem which leads to the equation
Posterior OddsDM = Prior OddsDM × LRDM.
This odds form of the Bayes rule appears to separate the ultimate degree of doubt a DM feels
regarding the guilt of a defendant, as expressed via posterior odds (i.e., probability of guilt
after considering the evidence divided by one minus this probability), into probability of guilt
before consideration of the evidence at hand (prior odds) and the influence or weight of the
evidence (expressed as a likelihood ratio).
Though Lindley (2014) makes it clear that the LR in Bayes formula is the personal LR
of the DM, some scholars have suggested treating LR as a quantity that can be (and should
be) calculated by a forensic expert; see, for instance, (Aitken and Taroni (2004), chapter 3;
ENFSI, 2015). The forensic expert can then communicate the result to the DMs3, who could
then apply (or envision others applying) Bayes rule to modify their respective prior odds by
the reported LR and arrive at their posterior odds as to the guilt/innocence of the defendant.
This proposed adaptation can be expressed by the equation
Posterior OddsDM = Prior OddsDM × LRExpert.
DMs then choose their actions (e.g., a district attorney decides to file criminal charges, a juror
decides to vote not guilty, etc.) according to their perceived consequences of the actions, given
the resulting posterior probabilities.
The appeal of this adaptation of Lindley’s approach is that an impartial expert examiner
could determine the meaning of the evidence by computing a likelihood ratio (LR), while
avoiding strictly subjective initial perspectives regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
This hybrid approach is embraced by many forensic scientists in several European countries and
is currently being evaluated as a candidate framework for adoption in the United States.
1The term weight of evidence appears in the book Probability and Weighing of Evidence by I. J. Good (1950), much earlier
than Lindley’s Biometrika (1977) paper.
2For a general exposure to the potential role of probability and statistics in the law the reader may consult Fienberg (1989),
Dawid (2002), and Kaye and Freedman (2011).
3ENFSI (2015) guidance document provides several examples illustrating how forensic examiners may use subjective proba-
bilities to arrive at a LR value to convey to the DMs the strength of evidence they examined. Furthermore, this guidance
document also indicates that forensic examiners may convert the numerical LR value into a verbal equivalent following some
scale of conclusions. Verbal expressions, however, cannot be multiplied by prior odds to obtain posterior odds.
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Lindley’s original framework provides a rational and coherent4 approach for an individual to
quantify her personal weight of forensic evidence. One of its greatest contributions is the clear
articulation that the meaning of the evidence cannot be established solely through the compar-
ison between the crime scene sample and a test sample. Lindley’s LR framework highlights the
importance of the role of alternative explanations for the collection of observed evidence (see
Lindley (2014), pages 117, 128), which, due to the sheer multitude of possibilities, will likely
require greater effort to investigate than will the prosecution claim alone. Additionally, when
the required personal components for computation are known for a given individual, Lindley’s
LR provides a straightforward path for quantifying that individual’s precise weight of evidence
on a meaningful and standardized continuum.
The general steps required for such an evaluation are as follows.
• The DM constructs a collection of all explanations to be considered for how the observed
evidence could have originated. Constructing a LR requires partitioning this collection
of considered explanations into two sets.5 Suppose the DM is a juror who will cast a
vote of either ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ at the conclusion of a trial. The DM may assign any
considered explanation for the observation of the evidence to one of two categories, guilty
and not guilty, according to whether he/she would declare the defendant to be guilty or
not guilty if the given explanation were known to be exactly true.
Let Hp1, Hp2, . . . ,Hpa denote the mutually exclusive and exhaustive collection of explana-
tions under each of which the DM would declare the defendant to be guilty. We have
Hp = Hp1 ∪Hp2 ∪ . . . ∪Hpa.
Likewise, we write Hd1, Hd2, . . . ,Hdb for the mutually exclusive and exhaustive collection
of explanations under each of which the DM would declare the defendant to be not guilty.
We have
Hd = Hd1 ∪Hd2 ∪ . . . ∪Hdb.
• After exhaustively sorting the set of considered explanations, the DM assigns his/her
(prior) degree of belief in each explanation before considering the evidence itself. This is
done by assigning a non-negative (subjective) probability to each explanation such that
the sum of all the probabilities is one. Let Pr[Hpi] be denoted by pipi and Pr[Hdj ] be
denoted by pidj . Denote the sum
∑a
i=1 pipi by pi0. Then the sum
∑b
j=1 pidj equals 1 − pi0.
Here pi0 is the prior probability from the perspective of the DM that the defendant is guilty
and 1−pi0 is the corresponding prior probability that the defendant is not guilty. We write
wpi =
pipi
pi0
and wdj =
pidj
1− pi0 . Thus wpi = Pr[Hpi|Hp] and wdj = Pr[Hdj |Hd]. Note that
any explanation not explicitly given a positive prior weight, including those that the DM
has accidentally overlooked6, is given a prior weight of zero.7
4For systematic introduction to the statistical meanings of “rational” and “coherent,” see Lindley (2004).
5The authors note that this constraint may prevent the DM from maximizing expected utility, as Bayesian decision theory
advises, when the utility assigned to a given action varies across explanations within one or both sets.
6If at any point the DM becomes aware of a previously overlooked explanation that will be given a prior weight greater than
zero, the DM would assign the new explanation to its appropriate group, renormalize the weights within that group so that
they sum to one, and continue the likelihood ratio calculation.
7A prior weight of zero indicates that the DM would never consider the explanation as plausible regardless of what data were
presented. This hardline stance would seem more likely to be taken unintentionally or as a matter of convenience rather than
conviction. That is, the entire collection of explanations with an assigned prior weight of zero can be removed from further
consideration, greatly reducing downstream workload. Additionally, even the most outlandish explanations could become
seemingly irrefutable, provided sufficient data. By this notion, it seems unlikely that any prior probability is rigid and exactly
zero.
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• For each explanation with prior weight greater than zero, the DM is to assess the prob-
ability of the observed evidence E occurring among all outcomes that could result from
the described scenario. Let Lpi denote the likelihood of observing the evidence under ex-
planation Hpi. (Some may find it more natural to denote this quantity as Pr[E|Hpi], but
we will use Lpi for succinctness.) Similarly, let Ldj denote the likelihood of observing the
evidence under explanation Hdj .
• Once a weight and a likelihood have been determined for each explanation of the observed
evidence, the likelihood ratio is given as the sum of the products of the likelihood and the
corresponding prior weight8 for each explanation in the guilty set divided by the sum of
the products of the likelihood and the corresponding prior weight for each explanation in
the not guilty set. This may be expressed algebraically as follows:
LR =
∑a
i=1 Lpiwpi∑b
j=1 Ldjwdj
. (1)
The LR is insensitive to the redistribution of prior weights among explanations that share
a common likelihood within the guilty set (or within the not guilty set). In the context of
source attribution, for instance, the DM may believe the alternative sources are a random
sample from a particular population and not have any additional information that would
lead to assigning different likelihoods among the alternative sources. In this instance
the DM might assign each alternative source a likelihood representing the probability of
observing the evidence by random selection from that population, and the denominator
becomes that same probability, regardless of what weights wdj would be chosen.
Practical Considerations
Computing a LR for anything but the simplest of problems involves approximations. Rather
than assign prior weights that exactly and genuinely reflect one’s personal belief, tractable and
familiar substitutions are made. One hopes that the resulting value is not overly sensitive to such
choices, but a rigorous uncertainty analysis is often difficult and not pursued. In such instances
the computed value can be viewed either as an approximation of unknown accuracy for the ratio
between posterior and prior odds; or as a score for which the appropriate interpretation becomes
unclear under Bayesian decision theory, even for the person who has computed it. Of course,
any individual need only satisfy herself regarding the perceived suitability of the computed LR
for personal use in Bayes formula. Attempting to compute a probabilistic interpretation on
behalf of another involves greater responsibility.
The LR in Lindley’s framework is, by definition, personal and subjective, which does not
prompt an expectation of transferability from one person to another. Some analysts may refer
to a collection of demonstrable data and/or theoretical arguments to suggest that a particular
probabilistic interpretation is normative rather than subjective. However, personal choice often
pervades these arguments as well: presuming representativeness of data not sampled accord-
ing to an established statistical method; defining the plausibility of candidate models in light
of available data (e.g., binary inclusion/exclusion assignments based on coverage intervals un-
der frequentist inference, posterior distributions under Bayesian inference); supposing a finite
sample behaves in accordance with assumptions and asymptotic theory. In lieu of strict and
8These weights assigned within each category illustrate that even computing a LR is not free from prior probability assignment
at the level of specific explanations.
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demonstrably necessary constraints leading all parties to a particular analysis result, personal
choices are made.
Perhaps in recognition of the subjectivity of any given interpretation, stating one’s as-
sumptions is a core component of a statistical report. This is necessary, but not sufficient.
Stating assumptions helps facilitate transparency, but not transferability. Transparency en-
ables a trained audience to label a presented analysis as reasonable or unreasonable - much
like a statistical hypothesis test. Of greater relevence for transferability is the set of results
corresponding to all analyses that are seemingly plausible (the analog of a statistical confidence
interval). Completely dismissing the importance of uncertainty in this context is equivalent to
assuming that all DMs are able to completely express their prior weights across the space of
explanations and models and that each DM shares the same weight assignments as the analyst.
Uncertainty analyses generally expand, rather than restrict, the range of plausible LR val-
ues. That is, values within a presented uncertainty range are necessarily plausible so long as
the corresponding assumptions are considered reasonable; however, values outside a presented
range are not necessarily implausible. Demonstrating a particular LR value to be implausible
requires first identifying the collection of all reasonable assumption sets and ensuring that no
model within this collection gives rise to that value. However, the set of all reasonable models
is nebulous, personal, and not optimizable in a normative sense. To begin to explore the rela-
tionship between data, assumptions and interpretations we consider multiple assumption sets
in a form we refer to as the lattice of assumptions. We present the resulting ranges of LRs as
an uncertainty pyramid. These are illustrated in a later section.
Without explicit statements of uncertainty, the lay audience may have a tendency to regard
a given quantitative interpretation with undue mystique, reverence, and authority. This is one
of several concerns expressed by Tribe (1971) in his seminal article titled “Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process” where he writes “the very mystery that surrounds
mathematical arguments – the relative obscurity that makes them at once impenetrable by the
layman and impressive to him – creates a continuing risk that he will give such arguments a
credence they may not deserve and a weight they cannot logically claim.”
When a statistical algorithm has been used to compute a LR, one may reasonably assume
that the output of the algorithm, given its inputs, is highly reproducible and therefore has no
substantial uncertainty. In this sense, a LR value may be transferable as a discrimination score
rather than as the ratio between posterior and prior odds. When viewed as a discrimination
score, the LR value does not abide probabilistic interpretation via Bayes equation, and its
meaning is no longer self-contained. As with any score, its meaning only becomes apparent
in the context of other LR determinations, evaluated by the same process, in suitable, con-
trolled reference applications. This information could be effectively conveyed for any method of
assessing evidence through objective descriptions of protocols followed and outcomes obtained.
Even when it does not lead to a transferable measurement, the mathematical foundation
described by Lindley provides useful guidance regarding questions to consider when evaluating
the meaning of evidence.9 Taking the DMs on a guided tour consisting of objective descriptions
9For example:
• How does the presented information demonstrate the frequency of correspondence that would occur between the crime
scene evidence and realizations produced by the defendant obtained in accordance with the prosecution’s explanation?
• What other explanations will be considered that do not imply the defendant’s guilt?
• How does the presented information demonstrate the comparative infrequency of correspondence that would occur
between the crime scene evidence and realizations produced in accordance with each of these explanations?
5
of demonstrable outcomes likely relevant to a particular investigation/analysis, including refer-
ence studies or other similar cases, provides the DMs an opportunity to answer these questions
based on an accurate understanding of metrologically sound information.
Likelihood Ratio as the Pathway to Posterior Odds
We now illustrate the process of evaluating a LR using more concrete notation. Suppose that
evidence y has been recovered from a crime scene and that, for simplicity, the only uncertain
component across the explanations the DM is willing to consider for how y came to be is the
identity of its source.10 Let S0, S1, . . . , SN denote the totality of potential sources, one of which
is responsible for y. The actual source of y is denoted by Sq, where q is unknown. The source
S0 is attributed to the defendant, and is of particular interest in that a DM will vote guilty if
and only if he/she is convinced S0 is the source of y. The event E0, the truth of which is in
doubt, is the following:
E0 : S0 is the source of y (i.e., q = 0).
The complement Ec0 of the event E0 is
Ec0 : S1 or S2 or . . .SN is the source of y (i.e., q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}).
In addition to y, suppose one or more control samples (that is, samples from known sources)
are available from one or more of the sources Sj , j = 0, . . . , N . Denote these, collectively, by x.
Suppose I denotes the totality of information available to the DM prior to being exposed
to the information supplied by y and x. According to the Lindley framework, a DM has prior
probability pi0 = Pr[E0|I] for the event E0 based on whatever information I is available to
him/her disjoint from y and x. After being informed about the available new information y
and x, the DM would like to update his/her belief concerning the event E0 in a rational and
coherent manner.
The DM is interested in Pr[E0|y, x, I], the probability that S0 is the source of y given all
the information available in the crime scene evidence (y), the control samples (x) and whatever
else (I). Using the odds form of the Bayes rule, and following Lindley (1977), Neumann (2012,
JRSS A) and others, we get
LR =
Pr[y|x,E0, I]
Pr[y|x,Ec0, I]
. (2)
In the context of this example, there is only one explanation under which the defendant
would be considered guilty. Hence, the LR numerator requires only the conditional probability
of y given x and E0 (and I). Suppose this is denoted by Pr[y|x,E0].11
When the number of possible alternative sources is greater than one, evaluating the LR
denominator, which corresponds to explanations under which the defendant is not guilty, is
more complex. The event Ec0 only means that S0 is not the source of y and, as such, it does
not say anything about which of S1, . . . , SN is in fact the source (for simplicity of discussion we
are assuming that there is a single source). We can decompose Ec0 as the union of the events
Ej , j = 1, . . . , N , where
Ej : Sj is the source of y.
10E.g., if y were a fingerprint, suppose the only relevant component of uncertainty to the DM is which person, or more specifically
which finger, left the impression; or if y consisted of striation marks on a bullet fragment, suppose the DM is only concerned
about identifying the gun from which the bullet was fired.
11For simplicity of presentation, we have dropped the term I with the proviso that all probabilities mentioned are conditional
on I. Furthermore, it is to be understood that expressions such as Pr[y] (or Pr[y|x]) refer to marginal (or conditional)
probabilities or probability densities depending on whether y is treated as discrete or continuous.
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Because the corresponding hypothesis of not guilty involves multiple explanations, computing
the LR denominator requires both a weight and conditional probabilities of y given x and Ej for
each Ej , j = 1, . . . , N . Suppose pi0, pi1, . . . , piN are the prior probabilities from the perspective
of the DM associated with the events E0, E1, . . ., EN , respectively. Then the denominator of
the LR takes the form
Pr[y|x,Ec0] =
N∑
j=1
wjPr[y|x,Ej ],
where Pr[y|x,Ej ] is the probability of y given x and Ej (and I) and wj = pij
1− pi0 . Thus, wj
are the prior probabilities of the DM associated with E1, . . . , EN , given E0 is false.
Given the quantities Pr[y|x,Ej ], j = 0, 1, . . . , N , and pi0, pi1, . . . , piN , the corresponding LR
is given by
LR =
Pr[y|x,E0]∑N
j=1wjPr[y|x,Ej ]
.
Based on the rationale presented earlier, the assessment of prior odds is left to the DM and
the forensic expert is tasked with the assessment of LR. Provided a LR value by the forensic
expert, a DM can obtain his/her corresponding posterior probability for E0.
12 At least, that is
the theory.
List of Concerns
In this subsection, we identify issues requiring careful consideration before implementing the
adapted Lindley framework favored by many forensic statisticians. Incomplete consideration of
these issues and any steps taken to address them stands to jeopardize the judicial process.
1. Whose Relevant Population?
According to the definition of the LR, any source given a prior probability greater than zero
by the DM can influence the value of the LR denominator and is therefore relevant; sources
given prior probability zero cannot influence the value of the LR denominator regardless of
the value of the corresponding likelihood Pr[y|x,Ej ], and are therefore irrelevant to the DM.
This set of sources with prior probability greater than zero forms the relevant alternative
population for the DM. This is often simply referred to as the relevant population. If there
are several DMs then each one could have their own set of weights wj and hence their own
relevant population. Given a particular relevant population, the weights assigned to elements
of that population can affect the LR unless the assigned likelihoods are constant across all
members of the population. In particular, wj =
1
N
is a special case, not a mandate.
2. Whose Likelihoods?
In practice, probability functions Pr[y|x,Ej ], j = 0, 1, . . . , N are rarely shared by all stake-
holders. A common strategy is for the forensic analyst permit a distribution over a class of
models, that will then be reweighted by consideration of empirical data. That is to assume,
conditional on a parameter θ (typically finite dimensional, but possibly infinite dimensional)
and the event Ej , crime scene data y and control data x are independently distributed with
known distributions g(y|θ,Ej) and h(x|θ,Ej), respectively. It is further assumed that, given
Ej , j = 0, 1, . . . , N , θ has a known distribution described by the probability function f(θ|Ej).
12As discussed earlier, though Lindley (2014) makes it clear that the LR in Bayes formula is the personal LR of the DM, many
treat LR as a quantity that can be (and should be) calculated by a forensic expert; see, for instance, (Aitken and Taroni
(2004), chapter 3).
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The function f(θ|Ej) is used to express a prior belief about likelihood functions for x and y
given Ej (not to be confused with the prior pij , which reflects prior belief in the event Ej).
Hence the joint distribution of y, x, and θ, given the event Ej , is described by the probability
function
a(y, x, θ|Ej) = g(y|θ, Ej)h(x|θ,Ej)f(θ|Ej). (3)
It is now an exercise in calculus to obtain the quantity Pr[y|x,Ej ] as
Pr[y|x,Ej ] =
∫
a(y, x, θ|Ej)dθ∫ ∫
a(y, x, θ|Ej)dθdy (4)
Note that the joint distribution of all relevant quantities has been assumed to be exactly
known through the choice of f , g and h. The distribution of interest for source j, Pr[y|x,Ej ],
is a conditional distribution that follows from the assumed joint distribution a(y, x, θ|Ej).
Asymptotically, as the number of control observations goes to infinity for each potential
source j = 0, 1, . . . , N , the value of Pr[y|x,Ej ] will converge to the same answer for many
different choices of f , g and h. With finite data, however, choices of f , g and h remain
important sources of uncertainty across stakeholders.
Occasionally, support for particular choices of f , g and h is given by showing them
to be consistent (as defined by some user-selected process for evaluating such things) with
empirical data from similar situations. The merits of these presentations often depend on the
available data being representative of other results one might obtain in a different or more
extensive data collection effort. Statistical uncertainty corresponding to such generalizations
is calculable only when the observed sample was collected according to a probability sampling
method.13 In the absence of a well-defined population and a corresponding probability
sampling method, the representativeness of data is a matter of personal belief, generally
based on the inability to identify any particular factor that would cause the sample to be
unrepresentative. Probability sampling methods are designed to ensure that no factor has
such an effect, regardless of whether or not it is identified.
Even when representative data are used to guide modeling choices, the existence of
alternative choices that are consistent with any available empirical guiding information is
generally overlooked, and the impact that making alternative choices has on the end quantity
is rarely, if ever, extensively explored. The likelihoods Pr[y|x,Ej ], and the resulting LR,
may be greatly influenced by the choices made by the forensic expert alone. One way to
overcome this deficiency is to carry out a more complete exploration of the effects the choices
have on the reported LR using what we call the Lattice of Assumptions. We will illustrate
this concept in a later section in the context of an example.
3. Incoherence
The framework proposed by Lindley (2014, chapter 10, page 260) and backed by the argu-
ments of Bayesian decision theory lead to the equations
Posterior OddsDM = Prior OddsDM × LRDM
13For finite populations, probability sampling methods refer to strategies for selecting a subset of a collection in a manner such
that each element’s probability of being selected is greater than zero and the selection probability for each subset is known.
In the case of infinite populations, sampling generally requires discretization to facilitate implementation.
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from the perspective of the DM and
Posterior OddsExpert = Prior OddsExpert × LRExpert
from the perspective of the expert. As pointed out earlier, the proposed adaptation is a
hybrid of these perspectives represented as
Posterior OddsDM = Prior OddsDM × LRExpert
which is no longer supported by the rationality and coherence arguments of Bayesian decision
theory and leaves only a single degree of freedom to the DM, viz., the assessment of pi0 =
Pr[E0]. Genuinely applying Bayesian decision theory upon consideration of whatever has
been communicated by the expert, say T , would require that each DM compute his/her own
LR for T ,
LRDM(T ) =
PrDM(T |Hp)
PrDM(T |Hd) .
The risk of misunderstanding and misapplication seems high when T consists of the personal
LR of an expert with whom DMs are unlikely to have any personal history or interaction.
This risk would be further increased following misdirection as to how DMs are to use the
provided number to obtain their own posterior probabilities.
4. Restrictive Application of Decision Theory
Under Bayesian decision theory, the DM is considered rational when they reach a decision
by maximizing their expected utility, EU . That is, for each potential act, the DM calculates
the weighted sum of utilities
EU(Acti) =
∑
Utility(Acti, Explanationj)× Pr(Explanationj |Evidence) (5)
and picks the act for which EU is largest. In essence, DMs should decide to act in the manner
that makes them happiest on average, according to their own beliefs and preferences.
When posterior probabilities are assigned to groups of explanations, rather than each of the
individual explanations, expected utility can be maximized only when the utility functions
for any two explanations j and k in a common group satisfy the constraint
Utility(Outcomeij) = Utility(Outcomeik) + cjk
for all i, where cjk is a scalar and Outcomeij is the result occurring if explanation k is
exclusively true and DM chooses act i.
In theory, there is no constraint as to how many groups are required to satisfy this constraint;
maximizing expected utility may require posterior probabilities for each of many finely re-
solved sets. The proposed usage of a LR requires that the explanations be partitioned into
two groups, and only facilitates posterior probability determination at this coarse scale. The
point here is that even if DMs decide to adopt an expert’s LR as their own, they may still
not be able to apply Bayesian decision theory.
5. Restrictive Meaning of Probability
When following a subjective Bayesian approach one uses a definition of personal probability
that could be viewed as an individual’s assessment of a fair value for a bet of E0 versus its
complement. It is assumed that there is a unique such value and that the individual is able
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to identify this value without any doubts.14 Moreover, it is assumed that this individual
(DM) is able to specify all needed personal probabilities in this manner and the collection of
specified probabilities satisfy the requirement of coherence. Lindley et al., (1979) discuss the
practical issues one must address in order to reconcile the generally incoherent probability
assessments by an individual. They consider several different approaches that one could
use in such a reconciliation process. See also Kadane and Winkler (1985). The fact that
such reconciliation efforts are necessary points to uncertainties associated with subjective
probability assessments. Nevertheless, results derived using such probability models are
treated as free from uncertainties (see, for instance, Taroni, et al. 2015).
The Restrictive Influence of Modeling Assumptions
We are concerned about seemingly innocuous modeling assumptions latently constraining the
space of plausible interpretations as might be presented by a forensic expert. In this section we
demonstrate a process for evaluating the restrictive influence of unsubstantiated information
that can creep in solely on the basis of distributional assumptions made by an analyst. It should
be noted that the data and modeling approaches used in this section are not exhaustive and
are not intended to represent analyses generally undertaken by any particular forensic practice.
As such, the actual numerical results obtained in this section are not of primary interest. Our
intention is to illustrate an application of assessing the influence of modeling assumptions on a
concrete example.
To evaluate the influence of a given assumption, one should consider the results of several
analyses, one in which the assumption was made (say, assumption A) and others in which
different assumptions (say, assumption Bi, i = 1, 2, . . .), consistent with empirically observed
data, are made. The influence of the assumption is reflected by the differences between the
conclusions drawn upon evaluation of each set of results. In cases where the differences are
considered to be substantial, assumption A has played a critical role, and the conclusion reached
from results of the analysis in which assumption A was made stretches beyond what the data
itself, used in the analysis, can support. In such a case, the basis of the appropriateness of
any particular assumption among the collection A and Bi, i = 1, 2, . . . should be carefully
considered. To aid in this effort, the investigator should describe, and display where possible,
the basis of their perception of the extent to which the assumption may be inaccurate.
Illustration: Glass Example
We consider an educational example discussed in chapter 10 of Aitken and Taroni (2004) in-
volving measurements of refractive indices (RI) for glass evidence. Suppose a window is broken
during the commission of a crime and fragments of glass are recovered from the crime scene.
Suppose also that fragments of glass were found on a suspect. Denote by x1, . . . , xm the RIs
of the crime scene fragments (bulk sample) and by y1, . . . , yn the RIs of suspect fragments
(receptor sample). The two propositions of interest are
Hp : The receptor sample is from the same source as the bulk sample
Hd : The receptor sample is from a different source than the bulk sample.
14For a systematic introduction to imprecise probabilities see, for instance, Walley (1991). This field remains an active area of
research (Augustin, et al., 2016)
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In this illustration we are operating as though there is no information available for us to
justify assigning different likelihoods to each particular potential source. Hence, we consider
the probabilities in the numerator and the denominator of the LR from the perspective of a
population of windows rather than weighting likelihoods from individual windows according to
their prior probability; see equation (6) and comments following equation (1).
Within Source and Between Sources Distributions
Interpreting the information contained in the observed RIs regarding these two propositions re-
quires understanding the distribution of RIs within each source and how that distribution varies
from one source to the next. (Note that if the RI distribution did not vary between sources,
then the RI observations would not provide any useful information about their source.) Consid-
eration of how the RI distribution varies from one glass pane to the next results in a distribution
of distributions. The collection of possible descriptions or models for the distribution of distri-
butions is overwhelmingly vast. The tendency is to limit the class of potential descriptions by
specifying properties of RI distributions that are assumed to remain constant from one window
to the next. In particular, the RI distributions across glass panes are often assumed to be
identical except for their location (e.g., mean or median). That is, the RI distribution for every
potential source is assumed to have exactly the same shape and exactly the same scale (or
spread). This assumption implies that the collection of values obtained by subtracting, from
RIs of each fragment within the glass pane, the median of RIs of all fragments from the glass
pane (i.e., x−median(x)), would have exactly the same distribution for any glass pane in the
considered relevant population.
In general, the results of analysis (e.g., LR) can be highly sensitive to deviations from the
assumption that RI distributions differ only by their median from one glass pane to another.
Generating empirical confidence in such a strong assumption would require collecting RI data
from many windows with enough measurements from each window so as to convince oneself
that strictly limiting the set of plausible distributions to a location family will only have a
negligible effect on the interpretation of the analysis results compared to, for instance, when
the shape and scale of the presumed location family are allowed to vary from one source to
another. Even with such a vast and consistent dataset, the possibility remains that the RI
distribution of any unexamined window differs substantially from the observed characteristics
of the other windows. Further illustration of the potential influence of assuming a location
family on the interpretation of the observed RI from a particular case is beyond the scope of
this paper. That is, the notion of uncertainty we portray in these examples is incomplete. The
uncertainty resulting from a more complete examination is expected to be greater than what
is illustrated here.
For the sake of simplicity, we proceed by supposing that the informed DM is willing to
make the location family assumption. To compute a LR for this scenario, let us first introduce
some notation. Suppose the cumulative distribution function (CDF ) of RI values from any
single window belongs to the location family of distributions G(y; θ) = G0(y − θ) for some
continuous distribution with CDF G0 whose median value is zero. Denote the corresponding
probability density function (PDF ) by g0. Furthermore, suppose that, across the (relevant)
population of windows, the median RIs θ(j), j = 0, 1, . . . , N are iid with (an unknown) density
function f(θ) and corresponding CDF F (θ). That is, we have assumed that f(θ|Ej) = f(θ)
for all j = 0, 1, . . . , N . For completeness, we display the expression for the resulting LR in
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Equation (6).
LR =
∫ (
m∏
i=1
g0(xi − θ)
)  n∏
j=1
g0(yj − θ)
 dF (θ)
(∫ (
m∏
i=1
g0(xi − θ)
)
dF (θ)
) ∫  n∏
j=1
g0(yj − θ)
 dF (θ)
 . (6)
Aitken and Taroni Illustrative Analyses
In the illustrative example provided in Aitken and Taroni (2004), it is assumed that g0 is the
PDF of a normal distribution with a standard deviation equal to 0.00004. That is, the collection
of RIs that could be observed from windows are independently and identically distributed (iid)
according to a normal distribution with unknown window-specific mean θ(j), j = 1, . . . , N , and
known standard deviation σ equal to 0.00004. Lambert and Evett (1984), in their Table 10.5,
give average RI measurements from 2269 different samples of float glass. Assuming that these
measurements are representative of the mean RIs associated with sources Sj , j = 0, 1, . . . , N ,
Aitken and Taroni apply kernel density estimation, using a Gaussian kernel, with varying
bandwidths to estimate the density f (or the CDF F ) from these sample data. The resulting
estimates are then used to evaluate the LR corresponding to various hypothetical pairs of
average RI measurements from the source (window) and receptor (suspect) (see Table 10.6,
page 341, Aitken and Taroni 2004). Applying the distribution estimates from Aitken and
Taroni to the illustrative example from Evett (1977) (see Table 1), accounting for interval
censoring of the recorded measurements to plus or minus 0.00001, produced corresponding LRs
of 196, 184, and 72, respectively.
Table 1: Refractive Index Measurements from the window and from the suspect
Measurements from 1.51844 1.51848 1.51844 1.51850 1.51840
the window
Measurements from 1.51848 1.51846 1.51846 1.51844 1.51848
the suspect 1.51848 1.51850 1.51848 1.51844 1.51846
Multiple Plausible Models
The consideration of multiple kernel bandwidths for estimating f begins to illustrate the po-
tential uncertainty due to the influence of modeling choices. A more complete evaluation may
be obtained by considering the set of all combinations of g0 and f that might be considered
plausible and how variable the computed LR is across combinations within that set. Plausibil-
ity is not an objective notion. The criteria for establishing the plausibility of a given proposal
is likely to vary from one person to the next. However, it is possible for the criteria of a specific
individual to be expressed in an objective manner. When criteria for plausibility have been es-
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tablished15, it is more complete to consider the set of all plausible models (possibly obtained by
filtering the class of all models through the plausibility criteria) rather than identifying a single
plausible model (or a narrow set of closely related models in the case of multiple estimates of
f obtained from different bandwidths) and proceeding as though it is the only plausible model
or representative of all plausible models.
Goodness-Of-Fit Tests and Plausibility Criteria
We note that it is common practice for a data analyst to use a statistical test of goodness-
of-fit to assess plausibility of one or more models. In our example, the data modeler could
assess the plausibility of a proposed distribution pair (g0 and f), given sample data, using any
of a number of goodness-of-fit statistical testing procedures. Some well-known methods are:
(1) Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, (2) Cramer-von Mises (CvM) test, (3) Anderson-Darling
(AD) test. For related other approaches the interested reader should also consult Owen (1995),
Goldman and Kaplan (2015), Liu and Tewfik (2013) and Frey (2008).
Here we consider the KS test for illustrative purposes. Any other procedure can be used in
place of the KS test but the computations can be more challenging. The concept is the same
for each criterion: the sample data itself cannot reduce the space of plausible models to a single
CDF . The KS test leads to a confidence band for CDF s that are consistent with the data at
a prescribed level of confidence, say 95%. When the KS test is used to assess plausibility, any
CDF that lies entirely within the confidence band would be deemed plausible given the sample
data. As the number of observations in the data set increases, the confidence band narrows
and the set of plausible distributions is reduced.
Between-Windows and Within-Window Data Sets for the Glass Example
We now consider the influence of two data sets on plausible choices for g0 and f .
Float Glass Data
The first data set (See Lambert and Evett, 1984) contains a collection of average RI mea-
surements obtained from various within-window samples collected from different manufactured
pieces of float glass. The number of observations contained in each sample is not provided, so
sample sizes may vary across the samples and there is some uncertainty as to how this data
should be viewed during evidence evaluation. If each sample contained a single observation, the
KS confidence band might be used to restrict the marginal distribution of a single RI measure-
ment obtained from a randomly selected window in the population. This marginal distribution
is determined by the choice of g0 and f as h(y) =
∫
g0(y − θ)dF (θ). If the samples consisted
only of means of many replicate observations, the KS bounds could serve to restrict the class
of plausible choices for f , but would not provide much insight to the choice of g0.
For illustrative purposes, we treat the data from this set as providing median RI values
for a sample of 2269 windows representative of the relevant population. We use the median
rather than the mean to reduce the sensitivity of the location parameter θ to the tails of
the distribution g0, which cannot be well-estimated from sample data. The 2269 reported
15Analogous to selecting prior distributions when conducting Bayesian inference, the choice of a plausibility criterion should
not be guided by the set of LR values they permit, but upon information available before application to the case at hand.
Additionally, while here we focus on the application of a plausibility criterion directly to the space of modeling choices, the
same concept applies to prior specification in a Bayesian inference framework. That is, one specifies the criteria by which a
prior is determined to be acceptable and seeks to filter the space of all possible priors through the plausibility criterion.
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Figure 1: Histogram of Glass Data
RI values are shown in Table 2. A histogram of these data is shown in Figure 1. Figure 2
shows the empirical CDF (eCDF ) for these data along with the lower and upper boundaries
of a KS 95% confidence band used to define which choices for f will be considered plausible
given the eCDF . In the lattice of assumptions illustration, we consider several estimates for
f based on Gaussian kernel density estimates fit to the 2269 observations with bandwidths
spanning from 0 (which corresponds to the eCDF ) to 2.155 × 10−4, which is the maximum
bandwidth for which the corresponding discrete distribution obtained by accounting for the
reported measurements being interval censored (to plus or minus 1 × 10−4) remains entirely
within the KS confidence band. CDF s for the discrete distributions obtained by accounting
for interval censored measurements and the corresponding underlying continuous distributions
are shown in Figure 2 for both the eCDF and the smoothest kernel density estimate. Kernel
density estimates resulting from the intermediate bandwidths of 10−5, 2× 10−5, 5× 10−5, and
10−4 are considered during computation but are not displayed. For illustration only, we also
include a CDF not produced by kernel density estimation. This CDF , referred to as Jump,
follows the lower KS bound for values less than the mean RI value m =
∑10
i=1 yi +
∑5
j=1 xj
15
for
the 15 sample fragments, and the upper KS bound for values greater than m, with a jump at
m. This CDF is shown in blue in Figure 2.
14
Table 2: Refractive index measurements for 2269 glass fragments given in Lambert and Evett (1984).
RI Count RI Count RI Count RI Count
1.5081 1 1.5170 65 1.5197 7 1.5230 1
1.5119 1 1.5171 93 1.5198 1 1.5233 1
1.5124 1 1.5172 142 1.5199 2 1.5234 1
1.5128 1 1.5173 145 1.5201 4 1.5237 1
1.5134 1 1.5174 167 1.5202 2 1.5240 1
1.5143 1 1.5175 173 1.5203 4 1.5241 1
1.5146 1 1.5176 128 1.5204 2 1.5242 1
1.5149 1 1.5177 127 1.5205 3 1.5243 3
1.5151 1 1.5178 111 1.5206 5 1.5244 1
1.5152 1 1.5179 81 1.5207 2 1.5246 2
1.5153 1 1.5180 70 1.5208 3 1.5247 2
1.5154 3 1.5181 55 1.5209 2 1.5249 1
1.5155 5 1.5182 40 1.5211 1 1.5250 1
1.5156 2 1.5183 28 1.5212 1 1.5254 1
1.5157 1 1.5184 18 1.5213 1 1.5259 1
1.5158 7 1.5185 15 1.5215 1 1.5265 1
1.5159 13 1.5186 11 1.5216 3 1.5269 1
1.5160 6 1.5187 19 1.5217 4 1.5272 2
1.5161 6 1.5188 33 1.5218 12 1.5274 1
1.5162 7 1.5189 47 1.5219 21 1.5280 1
1.5163 6 1.5190 51 1.5220 30 1.5287 2
1.5164 8 1.5191 64 1.5221 25 1.5288 1
1.5165 9 1.5192 72 1.5222 28 1.5303 2
1.5166 16 1.5193 56 1.5223 13 1.5312 1
1.5167 15 1.5194 30 1.5224 6 1.5322 1
1.5168 25 1.5195 11 1.5225 3 1.5333 1
1.5169 49 1.5196 3 1.5226 5 1.5343 1
Bennett Data
The second data set consists of 49 refractive index measurements on samples of fragments from
49 different locations on a single window and is used to evaluate the plausibility of within-
window distribution choices. These data were collected by Bennett et. al (2003) and are also
mentioned in Curran (2011) (see page 42).16 They are publicly available in the dafs package in
R. The original data set consists of RI measurements for a sample of 10 fragments from each
of 49 locations on a single window pane for a total of 490 readings. We have selected a single
fragment from each of the 49 locations (the listed value in the first row of the bennett.df data
frame in dafs). These data are reproduced in Table 3 for the convenience of the reader. For
illustrative purposes we treat these 49 RI values as representative of the RI distribution within
a single window, providing guidance for choosing g0.
For the 49 RI measurements in Table 3, the empirical CDF and corresponding KS 95%
confidence band are shown in Figure 3. In the lattice of assumptions we consider several
16Although not explicitly mentioned in Bennett et. al (2003), these data appear to be interval-censored with variable
interval half-widths (approximately) equal to 1.5× 10−6. Consequently, all of our analyses based on these data take
this interval-censoring into account
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Table 3: Refractive Index Measurements from 49 different locations from a single window. (Data
courtesy of Curran (2011))
1.519788 1.519901 1.519941 1.519941 1.519941 1.519963 1.519970
1.519974 1.519974 1.519974 1.519974 1.519974 1.519978 1.519978
1.519978 1.519981 1.519981 1.519981 1.519981 1.519985 1.519989
1.519989 1.519992 1.519992 1.519996 1.519996 1.519996 1.519996
1.520000 1.520000 1.520003 1.520007 1.520007 1.520007 1.520007
1.520010 1.520010 1.520014 1.520014 1.520014 1.520014 1.520025
1.520025 1.520029 1.520040 1.520043 1.520047 1.520047 1.520069
Figure 2: 95% Kolmogorov-Smirnov Confidence Band for the Lambert and Evett Glass Data. The bold line segments
portray the discrete distribution obtained by accounting for the reported data being interval censored to ± 0.0001. The faded
lines display the CDF of the underlying continuous distribution.
distributional shapes including those pertaining to a normal distribution, t-distributions with 1
and 0.14 degrees of freedom, respectively, and χ2 distributions with 2 and 3 degrees of freedom.
We also consider a small simulated collection of nonparametric CDF s (not belonging to any
particular parametric family). Some of these nonparametric CDF s fulfill additional constraints
of unimodality and/or symmetry. For each considered distributional shape, we identify the
range of scale parameters such that the discrete distribution obtained by accounting for the
interval-censoring of the reported within-window measurements is contained entirely within the
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confidence band. For each shape, we consider estimates of g0 obtained at 15 evenly spaced scale
values spanning this range. For a given shape and scale parameter, the LR is evaluated for
each pairing of g0 with each of the choices for f described above. Figure 3 provides a visual
summary of the analysis when the shape of g0 is assumed to be that of a normal distribution.
Analogous displays for other considered shapes are provided in the Appendix.
Figure 3: Top: 95% Kolmogorov-Smirnov confidence band for the CDF of refractive indices from 49
fragments from a single window (Bennett Data). The empirical CDF is shown in gray. The
faded red and green smooth curves respectively correspond to normal distributions with the
smallest and largest scale (standard deviation) parameters such that the discrete distributions
obtained, to account for interval-censoring in the reported data (shown using solid red and solid
green line segments, respectively), are entirely contained within the confidence band.
Bottom: LR values corresponding to various choices of F , reflected by position along the x-axis,
and the scale factor for the shape corresponding to a normal distribution. The left-most results
correspond to the estimate of F labeled as Jump, which is displayed in Figure 2. The remaining
positions reflect the bandwidth of the Gaussian kernel leading to the estimate of F used in
computing the LR. Within each choice of F , the LR values are staggered in order of the scale
parameter used to define g0 to emphasize the potential non-monotonic relationship between LR
and scale parameter. The points are color coded to indicate the associated scale parameter
values.
Lattice of Assumptions
When modeling the distribution of RI values for fragments from any single window, Lindley
(1979) assumed normality as do Aitken and Taroni (2004). We recognize this was done for
illustrative purposes only. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that normal distributions represent
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a tiny fraction of CDF s meeting the KS criteria, and the impact of exclusively assuming a
normal distribution is not clear until the set of LR values obtainable by using other distributions
lying within the KS bounds have been investigated. In recognition that a given individual’s
criterion for a distribution to be plausible may include conditions beyond a KS test, in this
section we examine the LR values obtainable by distributions satisfying a variety of assumption
sets. These assumption sets are displayed in the form of a lattice diagram (Gra¨tzer, 2011) as
shown in Figure 4. In the figure, when a line segment connects two assumption statements, the
assumption appearing lower on the lattice diagram is nested within (i.e., more restrictive than)
the assumption appearing higher. In Table 4 and Figure 5, we report interval summaries of
the range of LR values over the considered subset of the space of all possible models satisfying
each node’s criteria.
Discussion of Results
Results in Table 4 and Figure 5 clearly demonstrate that within this particular educational
example the distributional assumptions made regarding the data generating process can have
a substantial effect on the LR values that would be reported. Keep in mind that we have only
examined a (small) subset of all possible CDF s that would be deemed by the KS confidence
band to be consistent with the considered RI data. As such, the uncertainty pyramid portrayed
in Figure 5 is likely to under-represent the influence of choices of f and g0 within this example.
Once again, the point is that reporting a single LR value after an examination of available
forensic evidence fails to correctly communicate to the DM the information actually contained
in the data. Personal choices strongly permeate every LR value. If expert testimony is to include
the computation of a LR, we feel an assumptions lattice and corresponding LR uncertainty
pyramid provide a more honest assessment of the information in the evidence itself.17
17The proposal to present an uncertainty pyramid is not intended to lessen the importance of providing objective descriptions
of empirical results from analysis and investigation.
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A1: G0 is a continuous CDF
A2: G0 is a continuous,
unimodal CDF
A3: G0 is a continuous,
symmetric CDF
A4: G0 is a continuous, symmetric,
unimodal CDF
A5: G0 is the CDF of a scaled t dis-
tribution with k degrees of free-
dom, 1 ≤ k ≤ ∞.
A6: G0 is the CDF of
a scaled t distribution
with 1 degree of free-
dom.
A7: G0 is the CDF of
a scaled t distribution
with 0.5 degree of free-
dom.
A8: G0 is the CDF of a Normal dis-
tribution with known standard
deviation σ
Figure 4: Assumptions Lattice for the Glass Example
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Table 4: LR values corresponding to different choices for G0 and F .
G0 Shape G0 Scale Bandwidth for F (θ) LR
Normal 1.24e-05 (1e-05) 1.28e+04
Normal 1.24e-05 (0.00022) 3.32e+01
Normal 1.24e-05 Jump 1.76e+01
Normal 5.45e-05 Jump 1.67e+01
t with 1 d.f. 7.31e-06 (1e-05) 5.20e+02
t with 1 d.f. 7.31e-06 (0.00022) 3.56e+01
t with 1 d.f. 1.69e-05 Jump 1.73e+01
t with 1 d.f. 4.10e-05 Jump 1.70e+01
t with 0.14 d.f. 1.15e-07 (1e-05) 1.03e+03
t with 0.14 d.f. 1.15e-07 (5e-05) 2.90e+01
t with 0.14 d.f. 4.03e-07 Jump 7.44e+00
t with 0.14 d.f. 1.15e-07 Jump 5.58e+00
Non-parametric Symmetric Unimodal 5.78e-01 (1e-05) 1.66e+04
Non-parametric Symmetric Unimodal 2.45e+00 (0) 1.54e+00
Non-parametric Symmetric Unimodal 3.07e+00 Jump 4.32e+01
Non-parametric Symmetric Unimodal 6.87e-01 Jump 2.96e-01
Chi-squared with 3 d.f. 6.37e-06 (0) 1.26e+02
Chi-squared with 3 d.f. 6.37e-06 (5e-05) 4.16e-08
Chi-squared with 3 d.f. 6.37e-06 Jump 1.26e+02
Chi-squared with 3 d.f. 1.06e-05 Jump 3.28e-09
Chi-squared with 2 d.f. 8.66e-06 (0) 1.26e+02
Chi-squared with 2 d.f. 8.66e-06 (0.00022) 1.76e-07
Chi-squared with 2 d.f. 8.66e-06 Jump 1.26e+02
Chi-squared with 2 d.f. 1.75e-05 Jump 2.63e-07
Non-parametric Unimodal 5.02e-01 (1e-05) 2.79e+05
Non-parametric Unimodal 1.02e+00 (0) 6.71e-02
Non-parametric Unimodal 3.12e-01 Jump 9.15e+02
Non-parametric Unimodal 5.22e-01 Jump 5.75e-02
Non-parametric Symmetric 1.10e+00 (1e-05) 7.17e+04
Non-parametric Symmetric 3.82e-01 (0) 1.61e-08
Non-parametric Symmetric 2.91e-01 Jump 9.15e+02
Non-parametric Symmetric 3.58e-01 Jump 7.74e-08
Non-parametric 9.13e-01 (1e-05) 1.64e+05
Non-parametric 1.11e+00 (0) 7.49e-12
Non-parametric 2.46e-01 Jump 9.15e+02
Non-parametric 5.14e-01 Jump 8.41e-12
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Figure 5: Ranges of LR values corresponding to the choices of different assumptions for F from the
assumptions lattice combined with choices for G0. Solid lines show the range of LR values
when F is obtained by kernel density estimation. Dashed lines correspond to range of LR
values when using the Jump estimate of F .
Summary
The LR framework has been portrayed as having an exclusive, normative role in forensic expert
communication on the basis of arguments centered around mathematical definitions of ratio-
nality and coherence (Biedermann et al., 2015). These arguments are aimed at ensuring a form
of self-consistency of a single, autonomous decision maker (DM).18 However, decision theory
does not consider the transfer of information between multiple parties as occurs throughout the
judicial process when one or more DMs rely on forensic experts to help inform their decisions.
Thus, while the normative role of decision theory may apply to a DM processing information
presented during a case or trial in accordance with her own personal beliefs and preferences, it
does not dictate the means by which a forensic expert should communicate the information to
be considered.19
Bayesian decision theory neither mandates nor proves appropriate the acceptance of a sub-
jective interpretation of another, regardless of training, expertise or common practice. Any
normative properties of the process do not support any particular subjective inputs to the cal-
culation of a LR and therefore do not support any particular result. For anyone other than the
analyst who computed it, a reported LR value cannot be assumed to provide a direct path to
obtaining a personal posterior probability. The suitability of a LR value for use in Bayes for-
mula depends on strictly personal choices and has the potential to vary substantially from one
interpreter of the information to the next. This critical uncertainty component is not conveyed
by the LR value itself or by a list of assumptions behind it. The act of transferring information
may be more constructively guided by considerations of metrology than of decision theory.
18More specifically, the Dutch book arguments (Ha´jek, 2008)
19Some may argue that because any given DM is likely unfamiliar with formal decision theory, a trained expert should act on
their behalf to form a LR. As expounded throughout this paper, the interpretation of evidence in the form of a LR is personal
and subjective. We have not encountered any basis for the presumption that the surrogate LR of an expert will reflect a
truer implementation of decision theory than will the unquantified perception of the DM following effective presentation of
the information upon which the expert’s LR is based.
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Treating an expert’s personal LR as a quantity that is suitable for use in Bayes formula by
others without modification gives it a status of measurement that it has not earned.20 It is not
traceable to any standard nor has it been calibrated across the pool of stakeholders. It does not
come with an accompanying measure of uncertainty or reliability that could help the receiver
of a LR decide its fitness for purpose. Reproducibility properties of LR characterizations,
both exclusively among a pool of independent forensic experts and also inclusive of would-be
DMs, are often overlooked. For a quantity defined as the ratio of two subjective or personal
probabilities, the prospect that such investigations would yield substantial variability seems
very real. Yet, the proposed modification of Lindley’s framework uses the expert’s LR as
though it were a perfect measurement of the DM’s own weight of evidence.
In contrast, we believe that an expert’s public characterization of weight of evidence, if given
at all, should be modest, transparent and self-conscious in recognition that interpretation is
personal.21 One should openly convey the subjective, rather than normative, nature of choices
made along the path taken from observations and experiences leading to the offered interpreta-
tion – for example, defining a relevant population, presuming available data to be representative
(in the absence of rigorous probabilistic sampling), and selecting likelihood functions and prior
distributions. Validation efforts should not be misrepresented to suggest that a particular model
or narrow class of models is correct, rather than reasonable.22 Whether a particular plausibility
criterion and corresponding range of obtainable LR values qualify the offered interpretation as
acceptable is also a matter of personal opinion. In most cases, the range of LR values attainable
from models that would pass a given plausibility test is unknown, unless directly and rigorously
pursued.
The dependence of probabilistic interpretations and any associated uncertainties upon mod-
eling assumptions can be explored by conducting multiple analyses attempting to span the space
of assumptions meeting a specified plausibility criterion. Presenting an uncertainty pyramid
along with an explanation of the corresponding plausibility criterion and a description of the
data may provide the audience the opportunity for greater understanding of the interactions
between data, assumptions and interpretation.
If such uncertainty characterizations are considered untenable, one may be forced to conclude
that the adapted Lindley plan, though appealing in theory, is impractical to implement. It
does not mean that, just because one is unable to calculate the required value, one should
accept the value that can be calculated. Alternatively, an LR value may still be transferable
as a discriminant score attempting to sort between realizations under Hp and Hd. From this
perspective a LR value would not have direct, probabilistic interpretation, but its meaning
would become unmasked through empirical evaluations of its performance.23 More broadly,
objective descriptions of procedures followed and outcomes obtained throughout investigation
of the case and broader experience may present a promising path to ensuring transferability of
information from a forensic expert to DMs.
We hope the arguments presented throughout this paper will encourage the forensic science
community to be mindful of the many components of uncertainty that become evident when
viewing a LR as a measurement. Correspondingly, we hope best-practice guidances address how
to avoid overstating the authority or rigor underlying any particular interpretation of evidence.
20See JCGM (2008) and Possolo (2015) for a discussion of what constitutes a measurement.
21“I emphasize that the answers you give to the questions I ask you about your uncertainty are yours alone, and need not be the
same as what someone else would say, even someone with the same information as you have, and facing the same decisions. ”
– Kadane (2011)
22As a result of this common misunderstanding, we prefer phrases that use “plausible” or “plausibility” in place of “validated”
or “validation”, respectively.
23Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves (Peterson and Birdsall, 1953) are invaluable in such evaluations.
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Additionally, we hope the community pursues tools for descriptive presentations intended to
assist the DMs in directly establishing their own respective interpretations of evidence.
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Appendix
In this appendix we display the results for additional choices of F and G0. Six different
choices are considered for G0. They are explained below:
Figure 6 t distribution with 1 df
Figure 7 t distribution with 0.14 df
Figure 8 χ2 distribution with 3 df
Figure 9 χ2 distribution with 2 df
Figures 10-12 Symmetric unimodal nonparametric distributions
Figures 13-15 Unimodal nonparametric distributions
Figures 16-18 Symmetric Nonparametric distributions
Figures 19-21 Nonparametric distributions
The top plot in each figure shows the 95% Kolmogorov-Smirnov confidence band for the
CDF of refractive indices from 49 fragments from a single window (Bennett Data). The
empirical CDF is shown in gray. The faded red and green smooth curves, respectively,
correspond to members of the chosen scale family with the smallest and largest scaling
factors such that, the discrete distributions obtained by accounting for interval-censoring
in the reported data (shown using solid red and solid green line segments, respectively),
are entirely contained within the confidence band.
The bottom plot in each figure displays the LR values corresponding to various choices for
F , reflected by position along the x-axis, and the scale factor used with the shape chosen
for G0. The left-most results correspond to the estimate of F labeled as Jump, which
is displayed in Figure 2. The remaining positions reflect the bandwidth of the Gaussian
kernel leading to the estimate of F used in computing the LR. Within each choice of F ,
the LR values are staggered in order of the scale parameter used with G0 to emphasize the
potential non-monotonic relationship between LR and the scale parameter. The points
are color-coded to indicate the associated scale parameter values in accordance with the
legend titled σwithin.
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Figure 6: LR values when G0 is a t distribution with 1 degree of freedom.
26
Figure 7: LR values when G0 is a t distribution with 0.14 degree of freedom.
27
Figure 8: LR values when G0 is a χ2 distribution with 3 degrees of freedom.
28
Figure 9: LR values when G0 is a χ2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.
29
Figure 10: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric symmetric unimodal distribution shown.
30
Figure 11: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric symmetric unimodal distribution shown.
31
Figure 12: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric symmetric unimodal distribution shown.
32
Figure 13: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric unimodal distribution shown.
33
Figure 14: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric unimodal distribution shown.
34
Figure 15: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric unimodal distribution shown.
35
Figure 16: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric symmetric distribution shown.
36
Figure 17: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric symmetric distribution shown.
37
Figure 18: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric symmetric distribution shown.
38
Figure 19: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric distribution shown.
39
Figure 20: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric distribution shown.
40
Figure 21: LR values when G0 has the shape of the nonparametric distribution shown.
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